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The headway made in global vaccination is helping to reduce restrictions on 
activity, despite some heterogeneity by geographical area. This has translated into 
a relatively widespread economic recovery. It is also reflecting in lower uncertainty, 
a favourable macroeconomic outlook in the medium and long term and an 
improvement in the non-financial sectors’ financial position. However, certain 
segments continue to show greater financial vulnerability than before the COVID-19 
crisis. At the same time, risks linked to the adverse unfolding of the pandemic, to 
the recent disruptions in the global production chains and to a sharper and more 
persistent than expected increase in inflation, which could lead to a faster 
withdrawal of monetary stimuli than anticipated by the financial markets, persist. 
The materialisation of these risks might trigger abrupt asset price corrections in 
the international markets, adversely impacting economic growth and financial 
intermediaries’ credit risk. Greater buoyancy in demand and prices has also been 
observed in the Spanish real estate market, but the risks to financial stability 
appear to be contained for the time being.
1.1 Macroeconomic environment
1.1.1 Systemic and materially significant countries
Global	economic	activity	has	continued	to	recover	 in	2021,	albeit	at	a	more	
moderate pace in recent months. Against a backdrop of the spread of the 
COVID-19 Delta variant, activity patterns in advanced and emerging market 
economies have tended to diverge (see Chart 1.1.1), in good measure owing to the 
uneven levels of vaccination and to the differences in economic policy support.1 
Also, the appearance of bottlenecks in the global supply chains, prompted among 
other factors by the rapid recovery in demand in advanced countries and by rising 
commodity and transport prices, is affecting production, particularly in the 
manufacturing sector (see Chart 1.1.2).2 
The	 recovery	 of	 activity	 has	 been	 accompanied	 globally	 by	 considerable	
inflation	 rate	 hikes	 (see	 Chart	 1.1.3).	 These increases arise from various 
idiosyncratic factors which are, in principle, temporary. They include the base effects 
1  See Quarterly	report	on	the	Spanish	economy	2021	Q3, Economic Bulletin.
2	 	See	 Box  3	 “Euro	 area	 manufacturing	 bottlenecks”, Quarterly	 report	 on	 the	 Spanish	 economy	 2021	 Q3,	
Economic Bulletin. 
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derived from sharp falls in some services prices recorded at the height of the 
pandemic; the rise in energy and commodity prices from the abnormally low levels 
recorded in the summer of 2020; and, in 2021 Q3, the aforementioned impact of the 
global value chain disruptions on industrial prices and their potential pass-through 
to consumer prices. In certain areas, the degree of fiscal policy expansion necessary 
to speed up the recovery may also be playing a role.
The easing of restrictions to mobility has helped to consolidate the economic recovery over 2021, albeit with diverging outlooks between 
advanced and emerging market economies as a result of uneven vaccination rates and degrees of economic policy support. Global inflation 
rates have increased in recent months, in principle owing to temporary factors.
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY CONTINUES TO RECOVER IN 2021, BUT WITH DOWNSIDE RISKS DERIVING FROM UNCERTAINTY
OVER THE UNFOLDING OF THE PANDEMIC, THE PERSISTENCE OF BOTTLENECKS AND A POSSIBLE TIGHTENING OF
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
Chart 1.1
SOURCES: IHS Markit, national statistics and Institute of International Finance Global Debt Monitor.











Feb-19 Aug-19 Feb-20 Aug-20 Feb-21 Aug-21
 MANUFACTURING - ADVANCED  MANUFACTURING - EMERGING
 SERVICES - ADVANCED  SERVICES - EMERGING











Jun-19 Sep-19 Dec-19 Mar-20 Jun-20 Sep-20 Dec-20 Mar-21 Jun-21 Sep-21
EURO AREA UNITED STATES
UNITED KINGDOM JAPAN
Index
















-50 50 150 250 350 450
HOUSEHOLDS HOUSEHOLDS (INDUCED BY THE 
PANDEMIC)NFCs
NFCs (INDUCED BY THE PANDEMIC)GENERAL GOVERNMENT
GENERAL GOVERNMENT (INDUCED 
BY THE PANDEMIC)











 EURO AREA - TOTAL  EURO AREA - CORE
 UNITED STATES - TOTAL  UNITED STATES - CORE
 UNITED KINGDOM - TOTAL  UNITED KINGDOM - CORE
3  INFLATION IN ADVANCED ECONOMIES
%
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 27 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT. AUTUMN 2021  1. RISKS LINKED TO THE MACRO-FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT
The	current	medium-term	prospects	of	consolidation	of	the	global	economic	
recovery	and	a	 return	 to	moderate	 inflation	 rates	are	 subject	 to	 significant	
uncertainties. The progressive resolution of the global health crisis, on which the 
outlook of ongoing improvement in activity is based, is not guaranteed. The main 
risks include the slow pace of vaccination outside the main advanced economies 
and the possible spread of new, more resistant and infectious variants of the virus. 
Despite the prevalence of negative output gaps, the sectoral mismatches that are 
arising between a buoyant demand and a supply that is slower to respond to the 
recovery, owing to the appearance of bottlenecks causing recent increases in certain 
prices, may be more persistent than expected. This could lead to second-round 
effects and to core inflationary pressures as a result of the de-anchoring of inflation 
expectations, particularly in economies with a low level of monetary policy credibility.
Despite	 the	 favourable	 expectations	 for	 internal	 demand,	 especially	 in	 the	
advanced	 economies,	 the	 recovery	 continues	 to	 depend	 on	 the	 adequate	
calibration	of	monetary	and	fiscal	policy	stimuli. A premature withdrawal of such 
support may have highly adverse consequences. Thus, a faster and more intense 
normalisation of monetary policy than expected, particularly in the United States, 
might lead to abrupt corrections in asset prices. These corrections would bring 
about adverse effects on global financial conditions and activity in a setting of high 
vulnerability owing to the significant increase in public and private debt in many 
countries (see Chart 1.1.4). Likewise, an early withdrawal of fiscal stimuli in other 
areas, owing to possible political or market pressures, could lead to a reassessment 
of expectations regarding the repayment capacity of the most heavily indebted 
private agents, particularly non-financial corporations. The recent liquidity difficulties 
and the possible insolvency of China’s main real estate company, Evergrande, which 
had resorted heavily to external financing over the last five years, illustrates the types 
of risks generated by the above-mentioned increase in indebtedness. In the 
hypothetical case that these problems were to extend to the rest of the real estate 
sector or to the Chinese financial system, there would be severe consequences for 
growth in China, with contagion effects for the rest of the world.
Financial conditions have tightened somewhat in the emerging market 
economies,	although	they	continue	to	be	globally	favourable.	The increase in 
inflation has led to the start of a cycle of policy interest rate hikes in many countries 
in Latin America3 and Eastern Europe, to avoid possible second-round effects and a 
de-anchoring of inflation expectations (see Chart 1.2.1). Also, economies with greater 
fiscal vulnerabilities, or those recording episodes of social and political tension, have 
observed an increase in local-currency long-term interest rates, a depreciation of 
their currencies against the dollar and an increase in the external sovereign debt 
3  See the Report	on	the	Latin	American	economy.	Second	half	of	2021.	Outlook,	vulnerabilities	and	policy	space, 
October 2021.
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yield spreads. Also, the total or partial withdrawal of credit support plans in most of 
these economies has prompted a marked slowdown in bank lending, with possible 
adverse effects on the activity of these material countries for the Spanish banking 
system (see Chart 1.2.2).
A	 potential	 deterioration	 of	 the	 growth	 outlook	 in	 light	 of	 an	 unfavourable	
unfolding	of	the	health	situation	might	negatively	affect	the	financial	markets	
of	these	economies	and	tighten	their	financial	conditions,	as	economic	policies	
would	have	less	room	for	manoeuvre.	They might also be particularly affected in 
the event that the monetary policy stance in the advanced economies tightened 
more than expected or if national monetary policies had to face persistent inflationary 
or exchange rate pressures. The following can be noted in regard to the main 
emerging market countries with Spanish banking exposures:
In Mexico, the economy continued to recover during 2021 H1. However, there is a 
high degree of unevenness between the performance of services, supported by the 
progress made in the vaccination process, and the manufacturing sector, affected 
by global supply chain problems. The Mexican economy is exposed to risks similar 
to those of other emerging market economies, although it is more closely linked to 
the performance of the US economy. On the positive side, it has buffers against 
shocks, such as the swap line with the Federal Reserve and the flexible credit line 
Emerging market economies' central banks have started to tighten their monetary policies and are expected to continue doing so over the 
next twelve months, as credit growth moderates in light of the total or partial withdrawal of public credit support plans in most of these 
economies.
HIGHER INFLATION EXPECTATIONS EXERT UPWARD PRESSURE ON INTEREST RATES IN THE EMERGING MARKET 
ECONOMIES, WHILE CREDIT LOSES MOMENTUM
Chart 1.2
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with the International Monetary Fund. However, political uncertainty in the domestic 
and international fronts might negatively affect investment, which has been sluggish 
in recent years.4
In Brazil GDP growth stagnated in Q2, after a surprising rise in Q1. The country 
continues to accumulate imbalances in fiscal territory. Public debt is close to 90% of 
GDP and largely financed at interest rates linked to inflation or to the policy interest 
rate, which share a very pronounced upward trend. In addition, this debt is mostly 
acquired by domestic banks or their investment funds, which raises the sovereign-
bank nexus risk. Against this backdrop, the fiscal adjustment envisaged is subject to 
significant uncertainties. Political tensions have also increased significantly, and 
they are not expected to weaken in the short term in view of next year’s presidential 
elections. Indeed, Brazil’s financial markets have performed relatively worse, feeding 
back into fiscal vulnerabilities.
In Turkey, in 2021 H1 the economy continued to show significant buoyancy and 
notable imbalances which, however, have moderated with the gradual withdrawal 
of some stimulus measures such as the credit support. Bank lending slowed 
notably, with the exception of consumer loans, which maintained a strong growth 
rate. Although still significant, the current account deficit has decreased. 
Nonetheless, inflation has rebounded, standing at 19.6% year-on-year in 
September. Against a backdrop of sizeable external financing needs and very low 
international reserves, the Turkish economy’s biggest risk is the loss of confidence 
from the financial markets. This could be the result of reductions in policy interest 
rates, as occurred in September and October, that may prove to be early or greater 
than that discounted by investors.
1.1.2 Spain
The	 baseline	 projections	 for	 the	 Spanish	 economy	 envisage,	 for	 the	 short	
term,	a	continued	recovery,	favoured	by	the	headway	made	in	the	vaccination	
campaign,	the	consequent	lifting	of	the	pandemic	containment	measures	and	
the	economic	policy	support. This would help to recover the pre-health crisis level 
of activity over the horizon considered in the Banco de España’s most recent 
projections, which cover up to 20235 (see Chart 1.3.1). Activity would grow more 
during the first half of the projection period, boosted by the epidemiological 
improvement and by the implementation of NGEU programme projects.
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Uncertainty	 regarding	 the	Spanish	economy’s	growth	path	has	declined,	 in	
line with the recent improvements in the health and economic situation. Recent 
favourable epidemiological and economic developments in Spain have helped to 
reduce uncertainty over economic growth in the short and medium terms, in line 
with the behaviour observed in other advanced economies (see Chart 1.3.2).
Yet	developments	in	the	Spanish	economy	are	influenced	by	several	factors,	
including	the	possibility	of	greater	persistence	of	disruptions	to	global	value	
chains	and	increasing	inflation. First, if the supply problems recently observed in 
the global production chains ultimately weigh down on economic activity worldwide 
markedly and persistently, certain industrial sectors in Spain will be affected more 
durably. Another downside risk to activity, which has recently grown stronger, is the 
possibility of an increase in commodities and intermediate goods prices that is less 
temporary than currently assumed, with the consequent compression of households’ 
and firms’ income in real terms. This greater persistence could lead to the transfer of 
cost increases to final prices and wage demands, resulting in a more pronounced 
and long-lasting rise in inflation than that anticipated at this point in time.
The projections for the Spanish economy envisage high buoyancy in activity in 2021 and 2022, underpinned by the normalisation of 
economic relations and the maintenance of economic policy support. The pre-COVID-19 level of activity would recover over the forecast 
horizon, which covers up to 2023. The most significant downside risks include the potential negative effect of bottlenecks in the global 
production chains and a more persistent inflation increase than currently expected. Some uncertainty persists, although less than in previous 
quarters, over the health situation, which affects certain sectors in particular (e.g. accommodation and food service activities).
THE BASELINE FORECASTS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY ENVISAGE HIGH DYNAMISM AT SHORT TERM, ALTHOUGH
CERTAIN ECONOMIC AND HEALTH RISKS PERSIST
Chart 1.3
SOURCES: Instituto Nacional de Estadistico and Banco de España.
a The Banco de España’s September 2021 macroeconomic projections are shown. Their cut-off date was 14 September 2021 and they included the 
data available to that date, specifically the GDP flash estimate for 2021 Q2. Subsequently, the INE has published new data, which include the revision 
of Q2 and previous quarters and the flash estimate for 2021 Q3.
b See C. Ghirelli et al. (2021), "Measuring economic and economic policy uncertainty and their macroeconomic effects: the case of Spain", Empirical 
Economics. A decline in this indicator, constructed on the basis of the standard deviation of forecasters' projections of changes in GDP for 2021 
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Certain	downside	risks	related	to	the	unfolding	of	the	pandemic	and	its	impact	
on	economic	activity	also	persist.	These downside risks are related to the spread 
of new COVID-19 variants potentially more resistant to vaccines, which could lead to 
reinstating restrictions to mobility. They may also be related to the more persistent 
effects of the crisis on the business sector and employment. By contrast, if the 
health situation improves faster than forecast, economic growth might also gain 
momentum, mainly owing to a more pronounced freeing up by households of the 
stock of savings generated during the pandemic or to an early reactivation of 
spending by foreign tourists.
1.2 Financial markets and the real estate sector
1.2.1 Financial markets
The stock market indices in the main developed economies have tended to 
appreciate	over	the	last	few	months.	This was underpinned by the progress made 
in the vaccination campaign, the maintenance of an accommodative monetary policy 
stance and better corporate earnings than anticipated by the markets. However, 
some episodes of stock market price corrections have also been observed, mainly 
linked to fears regarding the impact of the spread of the COVID-19 Delta variant on 
economic growth, to the fear of a contagion effect of the Chinese Evergrande real 
estate crisis and to investor concerns about inflationary pressures possibly leading 
to the withdrawal of monetary stimuli earlier than envisaged. The S&P 500 index 
reached new all-time highs, accumulating a gain of 8.7% at the cut-off date for this 
report with respect to the levels at end-April. In the same period the EURO STOXX 50 
appreciated by 5.4%, while the IBEX 35 rose less (1.0%), affected by the negative 
impact of the spread of the pandemic in Spain over the summer in the sectors most 
exposed to it, such as leisure and tourism (see Chart 1.4.1). 
The	long-term	yields	of	higher-rated	sovereign	bonds	fell	between	April	and	
end-August and have rebounded since then, while sovereign and corporate 
risk premia have remained at low levels. The increase in long-term risk-free 
interest rates in recent months is linked to the rise in the upside medium-term 
inflation risks perceived by the financial markets. Following these movements, the 
long-term yields of higher-rated sovereign bonds stand at levels close to or even 
above (in the case of the UK and German benchmarks) those seen in Spring and 
much higher than posted at the start of the year (see Chart 1.4.2). The estimates 
available also point to an increase in term premia in recent months, although they 
currently remain well below their historical averages (see Chart 1.4.3). Also, since 
August long-term real interest rates have risen less than nominal interest rates 
(United States) or have even continued to fall in certain areas (the euro area), reaching 
highly negative levels (close to their all-time lows). This very low level of long-term 
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Positive corporate earnings and an accomodative monetary policy stance have supported the rise in stock market indices in international 
markets, although they have also been affected by one-off corrections. Long-term sovereign bond yields decreased between April and 
August and have rebounded thereafter, conditioned by the increase in the upside medium-term inflation risks perceived by the financial 
markets. Following these movements, these yields stand at levels much higher than at the beginning of the year. Despite these 
developments, term premia and long-term real interest rates remain at very low levels from a historical perspective. Euro area sovereign risk 
premia and non-financial corporations' bond premia have remained at low levels, supported by the continuation of accommodative monetary 
conditions and lower concern for credit risks.
STOCK MARKET INDICES HAVE RISEN, SOVEREIGN DEBT YIELDS HAVE INCREASED SINCE AUGUST AND SOVEREIGN
AND CORPORATE RISK PREMIA HAVE REMAINED AT LOW LEVELS
Chart 1.4
SOURCES: Refinitiv Datastream and Banco de España.
a Term risk premia are obtained from a decomposition of 10-year interest rates into risk premia by term and expectations of short-term interest rate 
changes. The expectations are obtained by forecasting the future short-term instantaneous interest rate using an ARFIMA model on each of the 
interest rate curve components (long-term level, slope and curvature) estimated daily. Once the short-term interest rate change expectations are 
obtained, the premium is obtained as the difference between the 10-year rates and the short-term rate expectations. The historical averages of 
the term premia are calculated between 2003 and 2021.
b The historical average of the 10-year real interest rate in the euro area and the United States is calculated between 2004 and 2021. Until July 2008 
in the euro area and June 2007 in the United States the data on French and US inflation-linked bonds are used. Thereafter, real interest rates are 
calculated in the euro area as the difference between the 10-year overnight indexed swap and the 10-year inflation compensation and in the United 
States as the difference between the 10-year government bond and the 10-year inflation compensation.
c High yield: ICE Bank of America Merrill Lynch Non-Financial High Yield Index. Investment grade: ICE Bank of America Merrill Lynch Non-Financial 
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risk-free real interest rates appears to be linked to various structural factors 
(demographic factors, low productivity growth, greater inequality, high demand for 
safe assets, etc.) and to other more conjunctural factors, such as, in particular, 
central banks’ asset purchase programmes. This factor has continued contributing 
to euro area sovereign risk and non-financial corporations bond premia remaining at 
low levels (see Chart 1.4.4). The latter, except in the high yield segment in the euro 
area, have even declined in recent months, currently standing below their historical 
average. This might be due to lower market concern for non-financial corporations’ 
credit risks, which would be in line with the more favourable performance of defaults 
and the positive balance between upward and downward credit rating revisions in 
recent months. However, around one third of the outstanding balance of debt 
issuances in the euro area with BBB rating continues to have a negative outlook. Box 
1.1 analyses in depth the factors determining sovereign debt long-term interest rates 
in Europe and the United States.
A	potential	earlier	than	expected	withdrawal	by	the	markets	of	central	banks’	
monetary	 stimuli	 might	 raise	 long-term	 risk-free	 interest	 rates	 further	 and	
trigger corrections in asset prices. This scenario could materialise, for example, 
if the rise in inflation observed in the advanced economies were more persistent 
than anticipated. The possible increase in yields could be transferred more intensely 
to corporate bonds, since their risk premia are abnormally low according to their 
historical relationship with their usual determinants, such as enterprise value and 
uncertainty over enterprise value, leveraging and risk aversion (see Chart 1.5.1). This 
seems to be related to the persistence of very accommodative monetary conditions.6 
In the stock markets, although risk premia do not appear to have been so influenced 
by expansionary monetary policies and are currently above their historical average, 
these developments could lead to a fall in share prices. In fact, their current high 
level, compared with firms’ earnings, seems to be largely due to low long-term real 
interest rates (see Chart 1.5.2). In any event, the impact of an increase in long-term 
interest rates on the price of risk-bearing assets would probably be cushioned if this 
movement were accompanied by an improvement in the macroeconomic outlook, 
given the beneficial effect this would have on the economic and financial position of 
the issuers of these assets. 
Under	this	hypothetical	correction	scenario,	there	would	also	be	a	tightening	
of	financing	conditions	with	possible	adverse	implications	for	credit	risk.	First, 
this shock could reduce economic agents’ spending, negatively affecting economic 
growth. Second, in this scenario, indebted agents’ financial burden would tend to 
increase, although the speed and intensity of this effect would depend on the structure 
of their liabilities and on how interest rates evolve over the different maturities.
6	 	For	further	details,	see	Box	1.1	of	the	Financial Stability Report Spring 2021 and	J.M.	Gálvez	and	I.	Roibás	(2021),	
“Asset	price	misalignments	in	financial	markets:	an	empirical	analysis”,	Working	Paper,	Banco	de	España	(forthcoming).
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A	potential	worsening	of	 the	macroeconomic	outlook	or	an	 increase	 in	 the	
uncertainty	surrounding	 it	might	also	 trigger	price	corrections	 in	corporate	
bonds and shares in the international markets. This scenario might arise, for 
instance, if the risks described in the previous section were to materialise. This 
would translate into a reduction in the expected future path of firms’ earnings or 
greater uncertainty about said path, which would adversely affect the value of shares 
through its negative impact on shareholder remuneration. Corporate bond prices 
would be affected to the extent that this situation causes risk premia to rise through 
an increase in perceived credit risks or lower investor tolerance thereto.
1.2.2 Spanish real estate market
House	sales	rose	sharply	in	the	first	eight	months	of	2021,	by	almost	14%	over	
the	 same	 period	 of	 2019,	 in	 contrast	 to	 housing	 supply	 which	 was	 more	
Corporate credit risk premia are below the level warranted by their historical relationship with determinants such as enterprise value and 
uncertainty over enterprise value, leveraging or risk aversion. For their part, stock prices in the United States and the euro area are high 
compared with the cyclically-adjusted earnings of listed firms. This appears to be explained not by low stock market risk premia (which are 
above their historical average) but rather by low long-term real interest rates.
PRICES OF RISK-BEARING FINANCIAL ASSETS ARE STILL HIGH COMPARED WITH SOME OF THEIR DETERMINANTS
Chart 1.5
SOURCES: Refinitiv Datastream and Banco de España.
a The difference between the corporate credit risk premium observed and that predicted by a corporate bond valuation model based on four factors: 
expected enterprise value (EV), uncertainty over expected EV, corporate sector leverage, and investor risk aversion. For more details, see Galvez and 
Roibás, “Asset price misalignments: an empirical analysis”, Working Paper (forthcoming), Banco de España.
b The cyclically-adjusted PER is calculated as the ratio of the share price to the 10-year moving average of earnings. The historical averages are 
calculated for the period 1997-2021.
c The stock market risk premium is calculated using a 2-stage dividend discount model. For more details, see Fuller and Hsia (1984), “A simplified 
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contained. The recent housing demand dynamics appear to be backed, not only by 
the improvement in the general economic situation and the accommodative financial 
conditions, but also by the materialisation of investment decisions that had been 
postponed following the onset of the pandemic and by changes in households’ 
housing preferences arising from that shock (see Chart 1.6.1). In particular, these 
changes are being reflected in a comparatively more dynamic demand for single-
family homes and new housing. But housing supply is less dynamic and, were the 
current patterns to continue, it could be insufficient to absorb higher demand in the 
coming years. In any event, in the medium term, the Housing Renovation and Urban 
Regeneration Plan, to be implemented within the framework of the Recovery, 
Transformation and Resilience Plan (RTRP), which has funding of €6,820 million out 
of the NGEU funds, could drive activity in the residential sector, including both 
renovation and new housing.
This increase in house purchases prompted an acceleration in average house 
prices	in	Q2,	reversing	the	slowdown	observed	since	early	2019.	House prices, 
which rose by 3.3% year-on-year (see Chart 1.6.2), were stronger both in the new 
housing segment (6%) and, to a lesser extent, in second-hand housing (2.9%). New 
house prices have risen the most in recent years, which could be related to the fact 
that new housing can be more easily adapted to buyers’ preferences and is in shorter 
supply than second-hand housing. Going forward, the recent sharp increase in the 
cost of building industry inputs, were it to persist, could put further pressure on new 
house prices. It should also be borne in mind that the growth in activity stemming 
from the implementation of the RTRP could further tighten the costs of building 
industry inputs and labour. Despite these recent developments in house prices, 
there are still no signs that these prices are, on average, significantly above their 
long-term equilibrium level (see Chapter 3 of this report).
In	keeping	with	 the	greater	dynamism	of	house	sales,	new	mortgage	 loans	
also	 recorded	 strong	 growth	 in	 2021  H1.	 Specifically, new lending for house 
purchase was some 40% higher than in 2019  H1. Nevertheless, the outstanding 
amount of mortgage lending has increased very moderately, as mortgage repayments 
have also risen, possibly because households have used the savings they 
accumulated in the early stages of the pandemic to early repay all or part of their 
mortgage loans. Another possible factor is the end of the moratorium programmes, 
which entails the restart of mortgage repayments that had been suspended.
This	mortgage	 loan	growth	essentially	appears	 to	 respond	 to	demand-side	
factors,	as	there	are	no	signs	of	easing	of	credit	standards	in	recent	months,	
although	 interest	 rate	 spreads	 in	 the	 fixed-rate	 mortgage	 segment	 have	
narrowed	recently.	For instance, average loan-to-price (LTP) ratios have held quite 
steady in recent months, although for floating-rate mortgages they have dipped 
slightly; this suggests that mortgage lending criteria may have become somewhat 
more stringent. Moreover, the proportion of mortgage loans with LTP ratios over 
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80% has not increased. Interest rate spreads have remained steady for floating-rate 
mortgages, but fixed-rate spreads have narrowed to their lowest levels in recent 
years (see Chart  1.6.3). At the same time, fixed-rate mortgage maturities have 
lengthened and their share of new mortgages has increased.
Housing transactions have risen sharply in 2021 to date compared with the same period of 2019, while housing supply dynamics have been 
weak. Accordingly, average house prices accelerated in Q2, especially in the new housing segment. Although mortgage conditions have 
remained generally steady, fixed-rate mortgage spreads have narrowed significantly in the year. In the commercial real estate market, average 
prices fell again in Q1, followed by some signs of recovery in Q2.
HOUSE SALES AND PRICES HAVE ACCELERATED SIGNIFICANTLY IN 2021 TO DATE, WHILE AVERAGE PRICES OF
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE SHOWED SOME SIGNS OF RECOVERY IN Q2
Chart 1.6
SOURCES: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Ministerio de Transportes, Movilidad y Agenda Urbana, TINSA, Colegio de Registradores and Banco de 
España.
a Housing supply comprises new housing, proxied by building completion certificates, and second-hand housing, proxied by the net supply of housing 
on the main real estate portals compiled by TINSA. Housing demand data refer to housing sales published by INE.
b The rate spread of each new mortgage over the euro IRS curve or swap curve. For floating-rate mortgages, the 1-year IRS rate is used to calculate 
the spread; for fixed-rate mortgages, the term equivalent to the mortgage term is chosen. The chart depicts the median of the spreads for the two 
types of mortgages. The 2021 Q2 data are provisional.
c To calculate these indices, each market is divided into strata of homogeneous real estate. A price is then estimated for each stratum, using a hedonic 
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In	the	commercial	real	estate	markets,	prices	fell	back	again	in	2021 Q1,	but	
showed	some	signs	of	recovery	in	Q2.	By market segment, prices of offices and 
industrial premises rose moderately in Q2, but prices of retail premises, which make 
up the majority of commercial real estate, continued to fall (see Chart 1.6.4). The 
average price of real estate in prime locations (the prime segment) also rose in Q2, 
after the decline observed since the start of the health crisis.
1.3  Non-financial sectors
1.3.1 Non-financial corporations and households
The	 economic	 situation	 of	 firms	 evolved	 favourably	 throughout	 2021  H1,	
although	with	 a	 notable	 degree	 of	 heterogeneity	 across	 sectors.	Corporate 
earnings posted a strong recovery, so that in most branches of activity turnover 
returned to 2019 H1 levels (see Chart 1.7.1). However, in the economic sectors most 
affected by the COVID-19 crisis,7 sales grew more moderately and are still well short 
of pre-pandemic levels. These more favourable developments in terms of business 
activity have driven up firms’ profitability. Thus, on Central Balance Sheet Data 
Office Quarterly Survey (CBQ) data, the percentage of firms in 2021 H1 with negative 
return on assets (ROA)8 is 8 pp lower than in the same period a year earlier, although 
it is still 5  pp higher than in 20199 (see Chart  1.7.2). This is consistent with the 
microsimulations made by the Banco de España, which project a gradual recovery 
in corporate earnings this year and over the next two years, in keeping with the 
greater economic dynamism expected. Nevertheless, this improvement will be 
slower in the economic sectors most affected by the health crisis, and is subject to 
the business risks indicated in section 1.1 above.10
The	recovery	in	economic	activity,	the	halt	in	the	tightening	of	credit	standards11 
and	longer	average	debt	maturities	all	appear	to	be	helping	ease	firms’	liquidity	
risks. Overall, in firms’ debt maturity structures, longer maturities account for a 
higher share of the total than they did before the COVID-19 crisis, partly owing to the 
Official Credit Institute (ICO) guarantee scheme. Recent developments in average 
  7	 	The	economic	sectors	most	affected	by	the	COVID-19	pandemic	are	those	whose	turnover	in	2020	was	down	
more	 than	15%	on	2019,	 specifically:	 hospitality,	 oil	 refining,	 social	 and	cultural	 services,	 transportation	 and	
storage,	the	textile	industry	and	the	manufacture	of	transport	equipment.
 8	 	Return	on	assets	=	(Ordinary	net	profit	+	Financial	costs)	/	Net	assets	(net	of	non-interest-bearing	borrowing).
 9  See “Results	 of	 non-financial	 corporations	 to	 2021  Q2”,	 Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin	 4/2021,	
Banco de España. 
10  See	“Impact	of	the	COVID-19	crisis	on	Spanish	firms’	financial	vulnerability”,	Occasional Paper No 2119,	Banco	
de España.
11  See “The	July 2021	Bank	Lending	Survey	in	Spain”,	Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin	3/2021,	Banco	de	España.
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payment periods to suppliers, which on CBQ data returned, in 2021 Q2, to levels 
similar to their pre-pandemic levels, also point to a drop in liquidity tensions.12
The	risks	related	to	the	solvency	of	non-financial	corporations	also	appear	to	
be	 easing,	 as	 the	 recovery	 in	 economic	 activity	 has	 been	 accompanied	 by	
lower debt growth. In consequence, average debt and debt burden ratios have 
fallen, in the case of the latter driven also by the decline in the average cost of 
outstanding debt. Developments in the volume and quality of bank debt and the use 
of support measures such as the ICO guarantees have been uneven across economic 
sectors and firms (see Chapter 2 of this report).
The	 economic	 situation	 of	 households	 has	 also	 recovered,	 as	 evidenced	 by	
recent household income and labour market developments, but again with a 
12	 	See	Box 1,	“Recent	developments	in	trade	finance	granted	and	received	by	non-financial	corporations”,	in	“Results 
of	non-financial	corporations	to	2021 Q2”, Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin 4/2021,	Banco	de	España.	
During the first half of the year, business turnover in most economic sectors returned to pre-pandemic levels. However, in the sectors severely 
affected by the health crisis, the recovery is proving to be slower and activity is still clearly below 2019 levels. Growth in corporate earnings 
has translated into an – albeit still incomplete – improvement in profitability.
FIRMS’ SALES AND PROFITABILITY HAVE IMPROVED, ALBEIT VERY UNEVENLY ACROSS ECONOMIC SECTORS
Chart 1.7
SOURCES: Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria and Banco de España.
a Economic sectors severely affected: those whose turnover fell by more than 15% in 2020.
b Economic sectors moderately affected: those whose turnover fell by more than 8% but less than 15% in 2020.
c Economic sectors least affected: those whose turnover fell by less than 8% in 2020.
d CBQ data. Return on assets (R) = (Ordinary net profit + Financial costs) / Net assets (net of non-interest-bearing borrowing).
R <= 0% 0% < R <= 5% 5% < R <= 10%
10% < R <= 15% R > 15%
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certain	degree	of	heterogeneity. Specifically, households’ gross disposable income 
(GDI) rose by 1% in 2021 H1, but it is still 3.9% below the 2019 levels. Also, at September 
2021, effective social security registrations13 were barely 1.2% lower than their pre-
pandemic levels (see Chart 1.8.1), placing the number of employed workers of the Labor 
Force Survey (EPA), in this same period, above those observed before the pandemic. 
Similarly, according to the European Commission’s consumer survey, at that date 
households either expected their economic situation to improve over the next 12 
months (households in the top two income quartiles) or to hold relatively steady 
(households in the bottom two income quartiles)14 (see Chart 1.8.2). It must also be 
borne in mind that since the start of the year there has been a significant cutback in 
some of the household income support measures, such as the loan moratoria,15 and 
this will have had most impact on the more vulnerable households.
The	average	debt	ratio	rose	slightly	in	2021 H1,	while	the	average	debt	burden	
ratio	fell	due	to	the	decline	in	the	average	cost	of	outstanding	debt.	Thus, the 
debt-to-GDI ratio stood at 94.9% in June, 4.2  pp above the pre-pandemic level, 
while the debt burden-to-GDI ratio was 0.5 pp above its pre-pandemic level.
The	 more	 granular	 data	 point	 to	 different	 lending	 dynamics	 according	 to	
certain household characteristics. Households that had loans before the outbreak 
of the pandemic have generally reduced their level of debt, albeit at an increasingly 
more moderate pace. The lowest reductions in the outstanding sum of bank loans 
are recorded among higher income households (proxied according to income by 
postcode) and among those resident in the municipalities hardest hit by the crisis 
(proxied by those with the highest percentage of firms with furloughed workers) (see 
Chart 1.8.3). The latter might be explained, at least in part, by the greater use made 
of loan moratoria in the areas most affected by the crisis.16 An analysis of the new 
debt taken on by households that had no loans at the onset of the pandemic also 
shows stronger lending growth in higher income areas and in those hardest hit by 
the crisis (see Chart 1.8.4). For all households, whether or not indebted at the start 
of the crisis, income is the variable that best explains credit developments.17 This 
suggests that higher income households, and especially those in the top income 
quintile, were most likely to take on debt and/or to have had greater access to credit 
since the beginning of the pandemic.
13	 	Effective	 social	 security	 registrations	 are	 total	 registrations	 excluding	 workers	 subject	 to	 furlough	 schemes	
(ERTEs by their Spanish name).
14  See the European Commission’s monthly consumer survey. 
15	 	For	instance,	the	application	period	for	bank	loan	moratoria,	with	a	maximum	duration	of	nine	months,	ended	on	
31 March 2021.	See	Royal	Decree-Law	3/2021	of	2 February 2021	adopting	measures	to	narrow	the	gender	
gap and on other Social Security and economic matters.
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At September, effective social security registrations were already very close to their pre-pandemic levels; indeed, Labour Force Survey (EPA) 
employment figures were above those levels. Workers who are still furloughed make up almost all employment still to be recovered. This 
positive picture of households’ situation was also reflected in their expectations for the next 12 months: in September, households expected 
their economic situation to improve over that horizon (the two highest income quartiles) or to hold relatively steady (the two lowest income 
quartiles). In general, households with outstanding loans before the health crisis have reduced their debt levels. Higher income households 
and those resident in municipalities with a higher percentage of firms with furloughed workers have done so to a lesser extent. These 
population segments also account for much of the new debt taken on by households that had no loans before the pandemic.
THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF HOUSEHOLDS ALSO RECOVERED IN 2021 H1, WITH INCOME, EMPLOYMENT AND
EXPECTATIONS ALL IMPROVING, ALBEIT UNEVENLY BY EMPLOYMENT SECTOR AND INCOME LEVEL, WHICH ALSO
CONDITION HOUSEHOLDS’ BORROWING DECISIONS
Chart 1.8
SOURCES: Ministerio de Inclusión, Seguridad Social y Migraciones, European Commission, INE and Banco de España.
a The average data for each month are taken and are seasonally adjusted.
b Effective social security registrations are total registrations excluding furloughed workers.
c Indicator = percentage of households expecting their economic situation to improve significantly × 1 + percentage expecting their economic situation 
to improve somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of households expecting their economic situation to worsen somewhat × 1/2 – percentage expecting their 
economic situation to worsen significantly × 1.
d Classification by income quintiles at postcode level. Each postcode is assigned the percentage of firms using the furlough scheme in the 
corresponding municipality. Households are defined considering individual borrowers (natural persons and sole proprietors). Each individual 
borrower is assigned the amount of credit resulting from the sum of the proportional part of each of the loans in their name.
e Postcodes in very small municipalities for which no postcode-level income data are available have been excluded. In order for all quintiles to have 
equal importance, a double allocation criterion has been used in each. The postcodes (municipalities) are ranked by income, by the impact of the 
furlough scheme (measured as the percentage of firms using the furlough scheme over the number of firms in the municipality in March 2021) and 
by the stock of credit at the start of the crisis (December 2019). Thus, the first quintile includes the postcodes (municipalities) that account for 20% 
of loans at the start of the crisis and have the lowest income level or the lowest percentage of firms using the furlough scheme in the municipality, 
and so on for the other four quintiles.
f The contribution to the change in lending to households that had no bank debt in December 2019 is defined as the ratio of their bank debt in June 2021 
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The	 increase	 in	 households’	 aggregate	 wealth	 —on	 account	 of	 the	 rising	
prices	of	both	 financial	and	real	assets	and	the	savings	accumulated—	has	
also	 strengthened	 the	 financial	 position	of	 households.	As consumption has 
increased, the household saving rate has moderated, but it is still above its historical 
average. In addition, the Household Budget Survey18 shows that all household 
income quartiles made a positive contribution to the significant increase in aggregate 
saving in 2020, although the contribution of lower income households was smaller.
1.3.2  General government in Spain
The	latest	data	available,	corresponding	to	2021 H1,	are	beginning	to	reflect	a	
certain	correction	in	the	imbalance	in	public	finances	in	Spain	compared	with	
the	high	levels	reached	in	2020.	The general government deficit stood at 8.7% of 
GDP in June in cumulative 12-month terms, slightly more than 2 pp below the end-
2020 figure (see Chart 1.9.1), while public debt stood at a still very high 123% of GDP 
in June. The deficit correction is explained by the pick-up in income (10.5% compared 
with the same period of the previous year) arising from the economic recovery under 
way, and by the moderation of expenditure growth, on the back of lower extraordinary 
expenses related to the response to COVID-19 (total expenditure remained constant 
compared with the same period of the previous year). 
Bearing	in	mind	these	developments,	the	Banco	de	España’s	latest	projections,	
published in September,19	expect	the	general	government	deficit	 to	 improve	
significantly	in	2021	and	over	the	next	two	years (see Chart 1.9.2). After reaching 
11% of GDP in 2020, the budget deficit could close 2021 around 7.6%. This forecast 
takes into account the measures adopted to temper the strong surge in electricity 
prices, and also the costs of a further extension, to the end of the year, of the 
COVID-19-related furlough schemes. The imbalance in public finances is expected 
to continue to correct in 2022 and 2023, thanks to the improved cyclical momentum 
expected and to the withdrawal of the extraordinary COVID-19-related measures.20 
Nevertheless, the deficit will still be above 3% of GDP in 2023 and public debt will 
decline by barely 5 pp over the projection horizon.
The	structural	deficit	and	debt	levels	envisaged	for	the	end	of	the	projection	
horizon	 (2021-2023)	 place	Spanish	 public	 finances	 in	 a	 vulnerable	 position,	
which could also continue over longer horizons. In addition to the high level of 
public debt expected for 2023 (over 110% of GDP), the structural adjustment of Spanish 
18  See the INE’s Household Budget Survey. Year 2020.
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public expenditure and revenue remains outstanding (over 3% of GDP), along with 
the challenges posed by population ageing. In the short and medium term, the 
monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the economic growth 
momentum foreseeable as a result of the take-up of the NGEU funds are expected 
In the first half of 2021 the general government deficit declined, a process that is expected to continue during the rest of the year and over 
the next two years. However, if no new measures are introduced, the public debt and budget deficit levels expected for the end of the 
projection horizon will remain high, representing a source of vulnerability for the Spanish economy. This vulnerability is mitigated by low 
interest rate levels, which are reflected in reduced and declining cost of debt service. Although, in the short term, the expansionary fiscal 
policy should continue to help support the ongoing economic recovery, the need for a future credible and sustainable fiscal consolidation 
process advises that details of this process be defined and announced without delay.
THE SPANISH BUDGET DEFICIT HAS DECLINED IN 2021, BUT IT REMAINS ABOVE ITS PRE-PANDEMIC LEVEL AND THE 
PROJECTED DEBT REDUCTION UP TO 2023 IS LIMITED
Chart 1.9
SOURCES: Intervención General de la Administración del Estado (IGAE) and Banco de España.
a Four-quarter cumulative data.
b Banco de España macroeconomic projections published on 21 September 2021. The squares in 2020 denote the figure revised by the National 
Audit Office (IGAE) nine days later.
c The pre-COVID-19 scenario replicates the simulations of the public debt-to-GDP ratio made with data and projections at December 2019. The 
neutral fiscal policy scenario simulates the debt projections drawing on the Banco de España’s latest forecasts (see Macroeconomic projections 
for the Spanish economy (2021-2023)), with no additional restrictions on the change in the structural balance. Fulfilment of the SGP scenario 
assumes a public debt consolidation plan with a reduction in the structural deficit, up to budgetary equilibrium, of 0.5 pp of GDP every year. The 
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to help contain this vulnerability. So far, the impact of the rise in the debt ratio on 
interest expenses (see Chart 1.9.3) has also been mitigated by the low interest rates. 
However, a hypothetical future increase in interest rates would trigger a spike in 
interest expenses, adding pressure to the fiscal position, although this effect would 
not be immediate, given the maturities of the public debt. Moreover, an accommodative 
fiscal policy remains necessary to consolidate the economic recovery currently 
under way. In any event, this does not preclude the need for fiscal consolidation, to 
ensure that, in the medium term, the Spanish economy is in a better position to 
address the challenges outstanding, and in a less vulnerable position in the event of 
future adverse economic developments or a crisis of confidence. According to the 
simulation exercises performed, in the absence of budgetary consolidation measures 
the debt ratio would remain around 115% of GDP over the next fifteen years, under 
the assumption that the Spanish economy maintained growth rates similar to the 
average of recent decades. By contrast, fulfilment of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), especially if it is accompanied by structural reforms, would allow to reach 
over that period a lower level of indebtedness than that observed before the outbreak 
of the pandemic (see Chart 1.9.4).21
1.3.3  Financial flows vis-à-vis the rest of the world and the international 
investment position
In	2021 H1,	 and	 in	 contrast	 to	 2020,	 international	 investors	again	made	net	
purchases	of	Spanish	general	government	debt,	an	 indication	 that	 financial	
flows	 vis-à-vis	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world	 were	 returning	 to	 normal. International 
investors’ net purchases in 2021  H1 totalled €41.2  billion. In consequence, their 
holdings, which amount to around 45% of Spanish sovereign debt, ceased to fall as 
a proportion of the total (see Chart 1.10.1).
The	 Spanish	 economy’s	 negative	 net	 international	 investment	 position	 (IIP)	
stood	at	78.4%	of	GDP	in	June,	representing	an	element	of	vulnerability	in	the	
event	 of	 deterioration	 of	 financing	 conditions	 in	 the	 international	 markets.	
Nevertheless, the ratio has fallen significantly since end-2020, specifically by 7.2 pp, 
of which 2.8 pp are explained by GDP growth. The valuation effects resulting from 
the increase in value of foreign assets held by Spanish residents and the decrease 
in value of Spanish liabilities held by international investors (see Chart 1.10.2) explains 
a further significant portion of this adjustment. In any event, this level of negative net 
IIP to GDP is still 3.4 pp higher than that existing at end-2019.
21	 	The	SGP	envisages	a	public	finance	adjustment	that	translates	into	an	improvement	in	the	structural	balance	of	
0.5 pp	of	GDP	per	year	until	the	level	of	this	balance	reaches	zero.	Furthermore,	the	debt	rule	requires	that	the	
excess	of	 the	debt-to-GDP	 ratio	 above	 the	60%	benchmark	be	 reduced	by	one	 twentieth	per	 year.	As	 the	
Spanish	public	debt	 ratio	 reached	120%	of	GDP	 in	2020,	 that	excess	 is	60 pp.	Therefore,	according	 to	 the	
European	rule,	the	debt	ratio	should	be	reduced,	on	average,	by	3 pp	per	year.
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Spain’s	gross	external	debt	rose	by	€66.4 billion	in	2021 H1;	although	it	fell	to	
197.9%	 of	 GDP	 thanks	 to	 output	 growth,	 it	 is	 still	 28.4  pp	 above	 the	 pre-
pandemic level. This high debt level is an element of vulnerability in the event of a 
possible tightening of financing conditions in the international markets. However, 
this vulnerability is mitigated, to a certain extent, by the debt composition, as slightly 
more than half is public sector debt (general government and Banco de España), 
and by the fact that the average repayment periods are lengthy and it is mostly euro-
denominated debt. 
Non-resident sectors again made net purchases of Spanish general government debt in 2021 H1, an indication that financial flows vis-à-vis 
the rest of the world were returning to normal. In the same period, the Spanish economy’s negative net international investment position (IIP) 
fell by 7.2 pp of GDP, thanks to positive valuation effects (due both to an increase in the value of foreign assets held by Spanish residents 
and a decrease in the value of Spanish liabilities held by foreign investors), net financial transactions vis-à-vis the rest of the world that were 
also positive (the counterpart of the current and capital account surpluses), and GDP growth.
IN 2021 H1, INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS RETURNED TO THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT DEBT MARKET AND SPAIN’S 
NEGATIVE NET INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION DECLINED
Chart 1.10
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The net IIP is the difference between the value of resident sectors’ foreign assets and that of the liabilities to the rest of the world.
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